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I.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Are Yelp's descriptions of an automated filtering process

it uses on its free website to attempt to separate more trustworthy
consumer reviews from less trustworthy reviews, statements that are
made for the purpose of selling goods or services -potentially
bringing them within the narrow "commercial speech" exemption to
the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.17(c)
(and denying them the anti-SLAPP statute's broad protection)- where
the undisputed evidence establishes that (a) the statements were made
available to the general public on Yelp's website and Y ouTube,
(b) the statements were made for the purpose of explaining why and
how Yelp's proprietary software performs a filtering process to
combat the problem of unreliable reviews, (c) Yelp does not license,
sell, or otherwise distribute its proprietary software, and
(d) purchasing Yelp advertising is unrelated to and has no effect on
the filtering process.
2.

Are comments on Yelp's website (such as a description

of its filtering process as "remarkable" and claims that the process
separates the reviews that are "the most trustworthy and from the most
established sources" from "the less trustworthy reviews") statements
1

of fact -potentially bringing those statements within the narrow scope
of Section 425.17(c) (and denying them the anti-SLAPP statute's
broad protection)- or are they statements of unverifiable opinion that
fall outside of Section 425.17(c)?
3.

Is a business whose primary function is to provide a free

public forum for consumer reviews "a person primarily engaged in the
business of selling or leasing goods or services" - and therefore
potentially within the narrow scope of Section 425.17(c) (and outside
of the anti-SLAPP statute's broad protection)- just because the
business sells advertising to a small fraction of the companies listed
on the site?
II.
WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED
In one fell swoop, the Second District Court of Appeal,
Division One, has withdrawn much ofthe protection of California's
anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16, from
speech by businesses that provide free fora for the public - including
consumer review websites like Yelp - and also sell advertising.
Under the Court's published decision, every public statement that
these businesses make about themselves or their websites - regardless
of their reason for making the statement- will fall within the narrow
2

"commercial speech" exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of
Civil Procedure Section 425.17(c), merely if the statements may
increase website traffic, because they indirectly may enhance the
website's appeal to advertisers. This cannot be the law. This Court's
review is necessary both to "secure uniformity of decision" and to
"settle an important question oflaw." Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(b).
Yelp Inc. ("Yelp") provides a free public forum, Yelp.com, for
consumer reviews and social networking. Fake and other unreliable
reviews are an ongoing problem for businesses like Yelp, which try to
provide reliable consumer reviews, and the issue has received
significant public attention.

~'Clerk's

Transcript ("CT") 832-834,

848-862. To address the problem- and strive to give Yelp users the
best information available -Yelp developed proprietary software that
uses a complicated algorithm to attempt to separate untrustworthy
reviews. CT 768, 832-838. Yelp discusses the filtering process,
explaining the purpose of the filter while making clear that its filtering
is not perfect. CT 552-554, 863-871. As Yelp established below, the
filter, and Yelp's public statements about it, are not intended to
support Yelp's sales of advertising on its website, but instead to
explain how Yelp's filtering process attempts to address the problem

3

offake reviews. CT 835-839,863-871. Yelp's review filter does not
favor advertisers or punish non-advertisers; it is unaffected by a
business's decision to advertise on Y elp.com, and applies the same
rules equally to all reviews. CT 835.
Plaintiff, a wealthy restaurant owner, claims that the filtering
process targeted trustworthy reviews, resulting in a lower rating for
his restaurants. CT 963-964. When Yelp refused to succumb to
Plaintiff's demands that Yelp somehow revise the results for his
restaurants to improve their scores, Plaintiff sued. He claims that
Yelp's description of the filter as attempting to keep "less trustworthy
reviews" from consumers (and similar statements) are false and
misleading. The trial court granted Yelp's anti-SLAPP motion
(rejecting Plaintiff's claims), but the Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that the commercial speech exemption, Code of Civil
Procedure Section 425.17(c), exempts Yelp's speech from the antiSLAPP statute's protection. The Court of Appeal erred at every step
of its analysis; its holding and analysis will dramatically expand what
the Legislature intends to be a narrow exemption to the anti-SLAPP
statute.

4

First, review is necessary to ensure that courts abide by Section
425.17(c)'s strict requirements, as this Court mandated in Simpson
Strong-Tie Co. v. Gore, 49 Cal.4th 12 (2010). There, the Court
rejected a plaintiffs attempt to broadly construe the commercial
speech exemption, holding that it applies only if plaintiff proves the
statements at issue fall squarely within its express terms. Here,
however, the panel reverted to the broad construction that this Court
flatly rejected. It held that the statute's requirements that the
statements at issue be "made for the purpose of' selling a good or
service and to an "intended audience" of prospective purchasers (or
persons likely to influence prospective purchasers) were satisfied by
statements directed to the general public, merely because the
statements might enhance Yelp's appeal to advertisers. This
interpretation renders the words "for the purpose of' and "intended"
surplusage, violating a fundamental rule of statutory construction.
Elsner v. Uveges, 34 Cal.4th 915, 931 (2004). The indirect
connection the Court of Appeal embraced is not nearly enough to
satisfY the statutory requirements. The panel's decision is contrary to
the vast weight of California law and should be reversed.
Section IV.A, infra.

5

Second, without any analysis, the Court of Appeal changed the
test for deciding whether a statement is a representation of fact within
the scope of Section 425.17(c). The Court held that Yelp's statements
were representations of fact "because they are intended to induce
consumer reliance." Op. 18. But the question is whether the
statement is capable of being proven false. The statements at issue
here- discussing whether Yelp's complex software program
successfully separates "trustworthy" reviews from "less trustworthy"
reviews- are incapable of being proven true or false. The panel's
decision to abandon the correct standard in favor of a test that focuses
on the speaker's motive contravenes clear California law.
Section IV.B, infra.
Third, the Court of Appeal's decision will capture a wide array
of non-commercial speakers within Section 425.17(c)'s scope, by
ignoring the requirement that the speaker be "primarily engaged in the
business of selling or leasing goods or services." The undisputed
evidence establishes that Yelp is "primarily engaged" in operating a
free public forum, and that a tiny percentage of businesses listed on
Yelp.com purchase advertisements. CT 1100. Focusing only on
Yelp's "revenue stream," the Court of Appeal held that "Yelp is

6

primarily in the business of providing advertising to businesses." Op.
19. The same thing could be said about any content provider that
receives income from advertising. But under well-established law, a
profit motive is irrelevant to determining whether speech is
commercial. The panel failed to acknowledge the critical distinction
between speech made for profit- which includes speech by
newspapers, book publishers and many websites- and speech that
proposes a commercial transaction. Its interpretation reads the word
"primarily" out of the statute- a result that must be avoided. Elsner,
34 Cal.4th at 931. Section IV.C, infra.
The Court's published opinion is a blueprint for how to evade
the anti-SLAPP statute in lawsuits against fora that allow the public to
share important information, and may subject Yelp and similar
companies to invasive discovery seeking disclosure of their trade
secrets. 1 Its decision is particularly problematic for websites, like
Yelp, that publish user-generated content, because such cases often
are proxy attacks on an individual user's speech (as is the case here).
1

Plaintiff's counsel agrees. See
http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202664538921/Yelp-Cant-DodgeSuit-Over-Its-Review-Filtering ("[Counsel Robert] Waxman said his
team is thrilled with the decision, which he believes could have
broad impact on corporate defendants.").
7

Moreover, this Court should grant review now- rather than
waiting to evaluate the impact of the Court of Appeal's analysisbecause if the decision is not reversed it may become untouchable. If
trial courts follow the Court of Appeal's directive and apply Section
425.17(c) to speech such as Yelp's speech here, defendants will not be
entitled to seek appellate review, and will be limited to the rarelygranted writ petition. C.C.P. § 425.17(e). Review of this case is
necessary to ensure that the Court of Appeal's injudicious opinion
does not, through default in the absence of more exacting review,
become the law in California.
III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Yelp's Role as a Public Forum.

Yelp Inc. owns and operates Yelp.com, a popular social
networking and search website that provides a forum for members of
the public to read and write reviews about local businesses, services,
and other entities. CT 829. Yelp.com is available to the general
public at no charge and without any registration requirement. Id. Any
member of the public who registers with the site can write reviews
and access various features, such as message boards and
communication tools. Id.

8

Yelp does not charge users to register a Yelp account; they need
only provide a name, zip code, and functional email address. CT 829.
Reviews can include detailed service descriptions and incorporate a
rating on a one-to-five star scale. Id. Business owners and service
providers can also post public responses to reviews of their business
on Yelp.com, or contact reviewers privately to engage in further
dialogue. CT 829-32. Yelp is also a local search engine, which
allows users to find businesses by entering search queries and
specifying a geographic location, and offers a variety of other
services. CT 831-834. These features all are free. I d. As of January
18, 2013, users had posted approximately 33 million reviews to
Yelp's websites. CT 830.
To support its free services, Yelp sells advertising packages to
enable businesses or service providers to purchase "Yelp Ads." CT
829-832. The reviews posted on Yelp.com are not affected by
advertising purchases; to promote integrity and objectivity, Yelp
advertisers cannot delete, change, or re-order ratings or reviews. I d.

B.

The Yelp Filter and the Yelp Filter Video.

Unreliable reviews are a concern for Yelp, and a problem that it
constantly fights. Unreliable reviews can take many forms, including

9

positive reviews written by friends, family members, or employees of
a business proprietor, or by paid reviewers. CT 835-839. Unreliable
reviews also include negative reviews written by business
competitors. Id.
Working to address the problem, Yelp developed specialized
software with an aim of identifYing potentially unreliable reviews.
CT 835-838. Yelp has a team of engineers who are tasked with the
ongoing development of improvements to the recommendation
software. Id. The software that guides the recommendation process is
confidential and proprietary - and Yelp carefully guards it. CT 768.
Reviews that are "not recommended"- i.e., those that the
software does not recommend due to potential unreliability - do not
count toward a business's aggregate star rating on Yelp or appear on a
business's main Yelp page. CT 835. Those reviews, however,
continue to appear on the reviewer's Yelp page as well as on a special
"filtered review page" for the business or service. CT 835-837. The
Yelp recommendation software applies uniform rules; Yelp's
advertisers cannot affect how the review filter operates; and the
review filter does not favor advertisers or punish non-advertisers. Id.;

10

see also CT 872 (contract with Plaintiff's company, including this
disclosure).
Issues related to fake reviews- including the filter Yelp
developed to address the problem- have received significant media
attention. For example, The New York Times has written about the
market for fake reviews, in which a stranger- often from a different
country- will be paid to write a glowing review about a company, or
a negative review about a competitor. CT 848-850, 853-855. A
Business Week article discussed a series of fake reviews submitted to
Yelp and other websites, noting that "Yelp runs its reviews through an
anti-fraud filter, with impressive results; every fake review the Texan
bought was flagged by Yelp's algorithms, though his fraudulent
reviews remain up on the seven other sites." CT 851-852.
NewScientist discussed software developed following a study
designed to spot fake reviewer groups. CT 856-857.
Yelp is explicit in stating that its review filter is not perfect. CT
836. In the nature of a disclaimer, Yelp states in its FAQ that "[t]he
filter sometimes affects perfectly legitimate reviews and misses some
fake ones, too. After all, legitimate reviews sometimes look
questionable, and questionable reviews sometimes look legitimate."

11

Id. Yelp disclosed the potential for inaccurate filtering not only in
statements to the general public, but to the Plaintiff in particular, in a
contract that one of Plaintiff's restaurants signed in January 2012. CT
836-837; see CT 872.
In 2010, Yelp released a cartoon video that described the
review filter. CT 838-839. Yelp's public affairs team created this
video to explain how Yelp tries to combat the problem of unreliable
reviews through its review filter. Id. The video states that the task of
identifYing unreliable reviews is complex, the Yelp filter is not perfect
in identifYing such reviews, and Yelp strives for improvement in its
efforts to identity unreliable reviews. I d. A copy of the video which was available on YouTube as well as Yelp's website (CT 39)was admitted into the record and separately filed.Z The record also
includes a transcript of the video. CT 552-554.

2

On November 13, 2013, Yelp updated its website to include
a new video explaining its software ("20 13 Video"). The 2013
Video can be accessed at http:/!officialblog.yelp.com/2013/11/yelprecommended-reviews.html. Yelp has disabled public access to the
2010 video. http://officialblog.yelp.com/20 10/03/yelp-review-filterexplained.html.
12

C.

Plaintiff's Dissatisfaction with the Reviews of his
Restaurants and Threats of Litigation.

Plaintiff describes himself as the largest private employer in
Mammoth Lakes, California, with interests in restaurants and a hotel
in the area, and a fortune in the hundreds of millions of dollars derived
from selling a software company to Oracle Corporation. CT 37, 768,
794-96, 899-901. Through a limited liability corporation, Plaintiff
controls at least two restaurants in Mammoth Lakes, California,
named "Red Lantern" and "Rafters." Court of Appeal Appellant's
Brief ("AB") 13; CT 900-901. Red Lantern and Rafters have
received a variety of reviews on Y elp.com and other review websites.
Some were positive, while others harshly criticized the quality of food
and service. CT 905-955. Yelp's recommendation software
considered some of these reviews suspicious, and filtered them. CT
902.
Rafters, in particular, received some questionable positive
reviews on Yelp. For example, in May 2011, during Mammoth's
slow season, Yelp received a series of 5-star (i.e., highest rated)
reviews for Rafters. CT 1096-1100. These reviews appeared in a
short period oftime from a single IP address associated with Rafters
manager Jack Carter- at least one from an account apparently created
13

by Mr. Carter himself Id. Yelp's filtering process caught and filtered
these and other reviews it deemed potentially unreliable. Id.
Beginning in 2011, Plaintiff and others associated with his
restaurants began "flagging" reviews on Yelp.com, and sending
complaints to Yelp about the operation of its review filter. CT 432,
456-465. On April 3, 2012, Plaintiff's counsel sent Yelp a demand
letter, specifically linking Plaintiff's concerns about third-party
reviews of Rafters and Red Lantern to his complaints about Yelp's
filtering system. CT 467-469. The letter demanded that Yelp change
the review filtering results for Rafters by taking down reviews posted
by a particular user and "unfilter[ing] the 49 filtered reviews on the
site for Rafters"; it also demanded access to "the source code and
algorithm for the so-called filters." Id. Plaintiff's counsel made clear
that Plaintiff would sue if Yelp didn't accede to his demands. Id.

D.

The Lawsuit and Appeal.

After Yelp rejected Plaintiffs demands, Plaintiff promptly
made good on his threats, filing this action on May 3, 2012, asserting
causes of action for unfair competition and false advertising under
California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 and 17500. CT

14

7-12. 3 In response to a motion to strike filed by Yelp, Plaintiff filed
his operative First Amended Complaint ("F AC"). CT 961. It
identifies five statements as the basis of his claims:
1.
"Yelp uses the filter to give consumers the
most trusted reviews."
2.
"All reviews that live on people's profile
pages go through a remarkable filtering process that takes
the reviews that are the most trustworthy and from
the most established sources and displays them on the
business page. This keeps less trustworthy reviews out
so that when it comes time to make a decision you can
make that using information and insights that are actually
helpful."
3.
"Rest assured that our engineers are working
to make sure that whatever is up there is the most
unbiased and accurate information you will be able to
find about local businesses."
4.
"Yelp is always working to do as good a job
as possible on a very complicated task- only showing
the most trustworthy and useful content out there."
5.
"Yelp has an automated filter that
suppresses a small portion of reviews - it targets those
suspicious ones you see on other sites."
CT 963 (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff served broad discovery seeking, among other things,
access to Yelp's confidential, proprietary source code and algorithms
3

The same day, Plaintiff sued a Yelp reviewer in a separate
action. CT 1106, 1110-1122. The trial court rejected Plaintiffs
attempt to learn the reviewer's identity. CT 1142-1144.

15

for its filter. CT 1107. In October 2012, in an order Plaintiff did not
challenge, the court denied his demand without prejudice. CT 753.
On January 25, 2013, the trial court granted Yelp's anti-SLAPP
motion. In doing so, it rejected Plaintiff's argument that the
"commercial speech" exemption, Section 425.17( c), applied, finding
that "the alleged misrepresentations concern the filtering process for
reviews and do not relate to the selling of advertising," and that the
challenged statements were "not actionable representations of fact.
Each statement includes subjective language." CT 1223.
On the second prong of the anti-SLAPP test- whether Plaintiff
had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the merits -the trial
court rejected Plaintiff's claims because he lacked standing and
"because the alleged misrepresentations that form the basis for his
claims under the unfair business practices and unfair advertising
statutes are opinions and puffery." CT 1227 (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's ruling,
concluding that Section 425 .17(c) removed Plaintiff's claims from the
anti-SLAPP statute. Op. 19-20. It found that Yelp's statements about
its filter were representations of fact, not because they were capable of
being proved true or false - and they are not- but "because they are

16

intended to induce consumer reliance on Yelp's reviews." Op. 18. In
doing so, the panel focused on what it speculated were Yelp's reasons
for making the statements, but overlooked the only evidence in the
record, which established that Yelp's statements were unrelated to
advertising. Id.; see CT835-839.
The Court next concluded - contrary to the undisputed evidence
in the record (CT 838)- that Yelp's intended audience was an actual
or potential buyer of its product, or someone likely to repeat the
statement to an actual or potential buyer. Op. 19. It concluded that
"Yelp's audience consists of reviewers, readers of reviews, and
businesses that may or may not purchase advertising on Yelp's
website"- in other words, any member of the general public- and
increasing its audience enhances Yelp's appeal to prospective
advertisers. Id. 4 Without any analysis of the complex commercial
speech doctrine, the Court characterized Yelp's description of its filter
as "commercial speech," suggesting that Yelp's statements have

4

Notwithstanding the undisputed evidence that Yelp does not
sell its review filter, and instead carefully guards this trade secret
information (CT 768), the Court concluded that "Yelp's statements
about its review filter ... are commercial speech about the quality of
its product (the reliability of its review filter) .... " Op. 17.
17

reduced First Amendment protection and thus that the trial court may
enjoin Yelp's speech without offending the Constitution. Id.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION DRAMATICALLY
EXPANDS THE NARROW "COMMERCIAL SPEECH"
EXEMPTION TO THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE, CONTRARY
TO THIS COURT'S DECISION IN SIMPSON STRONG-TIE

California's anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure
Section 425.16, was enacted in 1992 to protect rights of speech and
petition by ensuring that citizens are not punished through frivolous
cases filed to "chill" the exercise of those rights "and not to vindicate
a legally cognizable right." Simpson Strong-Tie, 49 Cal. 4th at 21
(citation omitted). "In 2003, concerned about the 'disturbing abuse'
of the anti-SLAPP statute," the Legislature adopted Code of Civil
Procedure Section 425.17 "to trim off a few bad branches" while
leaving the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute largely intact. ld. at
21-22 (citations omitted).
The statute's preamble evidences its intent to strengthen ,the
anti-SLAPP statute. Thus, any interpretation of Section 425.17( c)
must adhere to the overarching goal of ensuring that the anti-SLAPP
statute continues to strongly protect the rights of speech and petition
in California. See Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra

18

Club, 45 Cal.4th 309,316,319 (2008) (the "public interest"
exemption found in CCP 425.17(b) should be narrowly construed to
ensure the broad protection of the anti-SLAPP statute).
"[T]he legislative history of the commercial speech exemption
to the anti-SLAPP statute confirms the Legislature's intent to except
from anti-SLAPP coverage disputes that are purely commercial."
Taheri Law Group v. Evans, 160 Cal.App.4th 482, 491 (2008)
(emphasis added). See also Navarro v. IHOP Properties, Inc., 134
Cal.App.4th 834, 840-841 (2005). It exempts some -but not all commercial speech from the anti-SLAPP statute's reach.
As this Court recognized in Simpson Strong-Tie- where the
Court found that a lawyer's advertisement did not fit within the
exemption- "the Legislature appears to have enacted section 425.17,
subdivision (c), for the purpose of exempting from the reach of the
anti-SLAPP statute cases involving comparative advertising by
businesses." 49 Ca1.4th at 32-33 (citation omitted)). The First
District Court of Appeal has explained that "all of the speech
exempted from the anti-SLAPP statute [under Section 425.17( c)] is
commercial speech, but not all commercial speech is exempted

19

thereunder." All One God Faith, Inc. v. Organic & Sustainable Ind.
Stds., Inc., 183 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1217 (20 10).
Thus, Section 425.17( c) "simply does not provide ... that every
case arising from statements uttered by a commercial enterprise [is]
exempted from the anti-SLAPP statute's purview." Mendoza v. ADP
Screening & Selection Srvcs., Inc., 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1652
(2010). Indeed, the Legislature previously rejected an exemption that
would have applied to any entity "involved in the stream of
commerce." All One God Faith, 183 Cal.App.4th at 1214-1216.
The Legislature enacted Section 425.17 less than a year after
this Court decided Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939 (2002), and
chose to "closely track" Kasky's guidelines. See All One God Faith,
183 Cal.App.4th at 1215-1217. It did not, however, adopt the Kasky
test in toto; instead it adopted an exemption even narrower, and more
protective of speech, than the Court's holding in Kasky. Id. It
focused on the three elements of commercial speech that this Court
identified in Kasky: ( 1) a commercial speaker, (2) an intended
commercial audience, and (3) representations of fact of a commercial
nature. Kasky, 27 Ca1.4th at 964.
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Like all statutory exemptions to the anti-SLAPP statute, the
"commercial speech" exemption "should be narrowly construed."
Simpson Strong-Tie, 49 Cal. 4th at 22 (citation omitted). It exempts a
cause of action from the anti-SLAPP statute only if plaintiff proves all
ofthe following:
( 1) The cause of action is against a person primarily
engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or
services;
(2) The cause of action arises from a statement or
conduct by that person consisting of representations of fact
about that person's or a business competitor's business
operations, goods or services;
(3) The statement or conduct was made either for the
purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing
sales or leases of, or commercial transactions in, the
persons' goods or services or in the course of delivering the
person's goods or services; and
(4) The intended audience for the statement or
conduct is an actual or potential buyer or customer, or a
person likely to repeat the statement to, or otherwise
influence, an actual or potential buyer or customer.
Id. at 30 (emphasis added). A plaintiff who invokes the commercial
speech exemption in an attempt to evade the anti-SLAPP statute bears
the burden of proof. Id. at 26. Thus, Plaintiff was required to offer
evidence to establish each element of the Section 425.17( c) test.
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Plaintiff did not do that here. As explained below, in holding
that the exemption applies, the Court of Appeal disregarded the
evidence in the record and credited Plaintiff's unfounded allegations.
It expanded a narrow exemption from the anti-SLAPP statute, to

include a wide array of speech, based on nothing more than Plaintiff's
carefully-worded allegations designed to avoid the anti-SLAPP
statute's broad protection. This Court should grant review to ensure
that Section 425.17(c) continues to be a narrow exemption to the antiSLAPP statute.

A.

The Court Should Grant Review to Make Clear that
Section 425.17(c) Only Applies to Statements
Intended for Actual or Potential Buyers for the
Purpose oflnducing Purchases (here,
Advertisements).

Under the third and fourth elements of the test that this Court
enunciated in Simpson Strong-Tie, Plaintiff must prove that the
statements on which Plaintiff's claims are based were made to an
audience comprised of actual or potential purchasers (or people such
as reporters who may relate the statements to actual or potential
purchasers) for the purpose of inducing sales of Defendant's goods or
services. See C.C.P. § 425.17(c)(l), (2); Simpson Strong-Tie, 49
Cal.4th at 30.
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In Simpson Strong-Tie, this Court made clear that "close
enough" will not satisfy Section 425.17(c). The Court flatly rejected
plaintiff's attempts to evade the statute's strict requirements by
broadly and loosely construing its terms, holding that only statements
that fall directly within Section 425.17( c)'s plain- and narrowlyconstrued- terms lose the anti-SLAPP statute's protection. There,
Section 425.17(c) did not apply because "[t]o the extent that Gore's
advertisement 'consists of' representations about his services,
Simpson's action does not 'arise from' it; to the extent that Simpson's
action 'arises from' a representation by Gore, the representation was
not 'about' Gore's or a competitor's services or business operations."
Id. at 32 (citation omitted).
The panel in this case embraced the loose analysis that this
Court flatly rejected in Simpson Strong-Tie. Plaintiff could not and
did not offer evidence that Yelp's statements were intended for
prospective purchasers of the only thing Yelp sells - advertisements
(CT 832)- or that they were made for the purpose of selling
advertisements, because they were not. Yelp made statements to the
general public explaining the need for a filtering process and how it
works. CT 838; see CT 552-554, 863-871. And because purchasing
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advertising has no effect on Yelp's filtering process, Yelp's
statements about its filter have no greater relevance to advertisers than
to the general public.
The challenged statements never reference advertising on
Y elp.com, refer to Yelp's advertising services, or in any way discuss
advertisements. CT 552-554, 863-871. The video was not created by
Yelp's advertising sales team, but instead by its corporate
communications group. CT 838. Yelp describes its advertising
services on its website, and no description of the review filter,
including the video, is contained in the descriptions of Yelp's
advertising offerings. CT 839. This is dispositive because the statute
focuses on the speaker's "purpose" and "inten[t]." C.C.P.

§ 425.17(c)(l), (2).
This should have ended the Section 425.17(c) analysis. Instead,
the panel dispensed with the direct connection expressly required by
the statute, and held that an indirect connection sufficed. Op. 19. The
Court effectively held that any public statements by Yelp about its
business that might attract more people to Yelp.com fall within
Section 425.17(c)'s narrow exemption- and outside the anti-SLAPP
statute's broad protection- even without evidence that Yelp intended
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the statements to increase advertising sales, as Section 425.17( c)
requires.
Before the panel's decision in this case, California courts had
flatly rejected the fungible interpretation of Section 425.17( c) that the
Second District embraced here. For example, in Contemporary Srvcs.
Corp. v. Staff Pro Inc., 152 Cal.App.4th 1043 (2007), defendant Staff
Pro sent an email to its customers regarding the status of litigation
with plaintiff CSC; CSC sued for malicious prosecution (for Staff
Pro's alleged litigation conduct) and defamation (for the email). Id. at
1049-1050. Although the email discussed StaffPro's competitor CSC
and was sent to Staff Pro's customers, the Court held that Section
425.17(c) did not apply because the email focused on the litigation
(not Staff Pro or CSC's services), and did not contain representations
of fact regarding Staff Pro or CSC's "business operations, goods, or
services." Id. at 1054. The Court explained that "plaintiffs are
'primarily engaged' in the business of providing event staffing
services; they are not in the 'business' of litigating claims against
defendants." Id.
In Hawran v. Hixson, 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 272 (2012), the
Court of Appeal rejected a business's invocation of Section 425.17(c)
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in defamation litigation based on a press release discussing an internal
investigation regarding the company's mishandling of a key project.
The Court explained that the claim arose from statements regarding
plaintiff's departure from the company, not from other statements
regarding the company's business operations. Id. Narrowly
construing the statute, the Court made clear that the cause of action
must "arise from" speech within the Section 425.17( c) exemption, and
it is not enough if the "targeted statements" only "arguably may
broadly concern or relate to ... corporate events or business
decisions." Id. at 273. See also Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 181
Cal.App.4th 664, 677 (20 10) (Section 425.17( c) did not apply to claim
that plaintiffs' identities were misappropriated by Rolling Stone
magazine to promote cigarette sales because Rolling Stone sells
magazines, not cigarettes); Rivera v. First DataBank, Inc., 187
Cal.App.4th 709, 718 (201 0) (Section 425.17(c) did not apply to claim
based on allegedly misleading medication publication, because
statements were not made to sell the publisher's services or goods;
alternative claim that the publisher served as an agent of the pharmacy
was unsupported by evidence "and a mere allegation does not
suffice"); Sunset Millennium Associates, LLC v. LHO Grafton Hotel,

26

L.P., 146 Cal.App.4th 300,312 (2006) (Section 425.17(c) did not
apply to claim centered around hotel's challenge to competitor's
attempts to expand; the statements were made during an
administrative and litigation process and "not for the purpose of
promoting defendant's hotel 'goods and services' as the phrase is
used" in the statute). Cf. Kasky, 27 Ca1.4th at 963 (Nike's speech was
commercial "[b]ecause Nike's purpose in making these statements ...
was to maintain its sales and profits .... " (emphasis added)); 5
Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Fed., 115 Cal.App.4th 322,350
(2004) (rejecting claim that Planned Parenthood's speech on its
website was commercial speech because educational text was
accompanied by advertisements).
In direct contrast to all of these decisions, the Court of Appeal's
decision treats Yelp's statements to the public- which had no
advertising purpose (CT 835-838)- as commercial speech directed to
a commercial audience, for a commercial purpose. In each of these

5

In Kasky, liability was permitted because "the alleged false
and misleading statements all relate to the commercial portions of
the speech in question -the description of actual conditions and
practices in factories that produce Nike's products- and thus the
proposed regulations reach only that commercial purpose." Id. at
966.
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cases, the speech at issue had the potential to indirectly increase sales
-as the Court here held was enough to trigger Section 425.17(c)- but
each of these courts followed this Court's directive in Simpson
Strong-Tie and narrowly construed the statute to reject its application.
The panel's decision will inject confusion and ambiguity into a
statute that- under this Court's careful analysis in Simpson StrongTie and the previously uniform case law interpreting the statute should be clear and unambiguous. If the exemption is expanded to
capture any statements or conduct that make a website more attractive
for advertisers - which is what the Court did here - it will rapidly
become the broader exemption for all commercial activity that was
rejected by the Legislature. All One God Faith, 183 Cal.App.4th at
1215.
At bottom, the Court of Appeal erred in conflating the audience
for Yelp's website in general, and the different (and mqch smaller)
audience of prospective advertisers. To the extent Yelp is primarily in
the business of providing a free public forum for consumers - as the
evidence establishes it is- the Section 425.17( c) exemption does not
apply because Yelp does not primarily sell or lease goods or services.
To the extent that Yelp is primarily in the business of selling
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advertising services - as the Court of Appeal found it to be -the
exemption still does not apply because the statements at issue were
about the filtering process for reviews posted on Yelp.com, and not
about the advertising services that Yelp sells. 6 In other words, if Yelp
is not primarily in the business of providing public access to consumer
reviews, then its statements about its filtering process for those
reviews cannot be statements made for the purpose of obtaining
approval for, promoting or securing sales of, or commercial
transactions in, Yelp's services. The Court of Appeal plainly erred in
failing to follow Section 425.17(c)'s strict requirements. Its decision
should be reversed.
B.

The Court Should Grant Review to Make Clear that
Section 425.17(c) Does Not Apply to a Website
Operator's Opinions Regarding an Aspect of Its
Business.
1.

Section 425.17(c) Applies Only to Verifiable
Statements of Fact in the Commercial Context.

Section 425.17(c) does not apply to this action because the
statements at issue are not verifiably false "representations of fact," as
6

This is made clear by the facts that (1) purchasing
advertising does not alter the way in which the filtering process is
applied to an advertising customer's reviews (CT 835), and (2) Yelp
does not license or sell the software that provides the filtering
process (CT 768).

29

required by the statute. Simpson Strong-Tie, 49 Ca1.4th at 29-30. As
discussed above, the Legislature incorporated the "representations of
fact" requirement from Kasky, 27 Cal.4th at 960, as one element of
the Section 425.17(c) test. All One God Faith, 183 Cal.App.4th at
1215. In Kasky, this Court explained four different times that a
primary justification for treating commercial speech differently is that
"representations of fact" about a speaker's own product or service are
verifiable. I d. at 955, 962, 967, 969 (citing Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va.
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976)).
This Court noted that the United States Supreme Court had
found factual representations to quality as "commercial in character"
where the statements described facts that were readily-verifiable by
the speaker, such as the "alcohol content on [a] beer bottle label," "an
attorney's letterhead and business cards describing attorney's
qualifications," and "advertisements showing prices of prescription
drugs." Kasky, 27 Cal.4th at 961 (citations omitted). Such
objectively-verifiable statements are the types of factual
representations that constitute commercial speech.
In contrast to the lesser protection afforded to verifiable
statements of fact that are commercial in nature, statements of opinion
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on any topic "will receive full constitutional protection." Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990). Accordingly, where a
plaintiff brings false advertising and unfair competition claims against
even a commercial speaker based on statements of opinion, the speech
is protected as non-commercial speech. See Bernardo, I 15
Cal.App.4th at :348-349. Thus, California courts long have held that
statements of opinion about a commercial speaker's own products or
services that are akin to "mere puffing" cannot support liability under
California consumer protection law. .ll,g,, Consumer Advocates v.
Echostar Satellite Corp., 113 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1361 n.3 (2003);
Hauterv.Zogarts, 14Cal.3d 104,111 (1975).
The question is not whether the statements "are intended to
induce consumer reliance on Yelp's reviews" as the Court of Appeal
mistakenly held. Op. 18. The question is whether the statements are
objective representations of fact rather than subjective statements of
opinion that cannot be verified. Kasky, 27 Cal. 4th at 962.
For example, in Bernardo, the court rejected false advertising
and unfair competition claims for statements on various "fact sheets"
on a publicly-accessible website, including discussion of a disputed
scientific theory. 115 Cal.App.4th at 327-328, 331-334. The Court
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held that the "challenged statements ... were expressions of opinion
about an issue of genuine scientific debate," fully protected by the
First Amendment. Id. at 342. Plaintiff's claim failed because she
"sought to enjoin not readily verifiable factual assertions about
matters within Planned Parenthood's own knowledge, but Planned
Parenthood's statements of opinion" about a topic of scientific debate.
Id. at 348 (original emphasis).
California courts consistently have made the same distinction in
the context of libel claims, holding that "an expression of subjective
judgment by the speaker" that does not assert facts is not actionable.

k, Moyer v. Amador Valley J. Union High School Dist., 225
Cal.App.3d 720, 725 (1990) (statement describing someone as "worst
teacher" not actionable because it was an "expression of subjective
judgment by the speaker"); Overbill Farms, Inc. v. Lopez, 190
Cal.App.4th 1248, 1262-1263 (2010) ("general statements charging a
person with being racist, unfair, or unjust- without more- ... ·
constitute mere name calling and do not contain a provably false
assertion of fact"). Thus, commentary that includes "language used in
a loose, figurative sense" is incapable of being proven false and is
therefore "accorded constitutional protection." Ferlauto v. Hamsher,
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74 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401 (1999) (quotations, alterations omitted);
see also Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal.3d 596, 601602 (1976) (statements that plaintiffs were apparently willing to
sacrifice the interests of their union members to further their own
political aspirations and personal ambitions constituted protected
statements of opinion).

2.

The Challenged Descriptions of Yelp's Filtering
Process Are Not Verifiable, and Thus Are
Opinions Rather than Statements of Fact.

None of the statements underlying Plaintiffs claims come close
to satisfying the requirement that the statements be verifiable. CT
963. Plaintiff did not and could never explain what it might mean for
a review to be "the most trusted," or "the most trustworthy" (by
whom? compared to what? on what basis?) or how anyone could
prove such an inherently subjective claim. Similarly, a phrase like,
"the most established sources" cannot be proven true or false, because
the degree to which a source is "most established" is an inherently
subjective assessment that cannot be objectively quantified. Indeed,
what is "most established" to one reader may not qualify as "most
established" to another.
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None of the statements that Plaintiff challenges includes the
kind of specific, objective criteria that Plaintiff or a court might rely
upon to determine for itself if a review is "trustworthy" or a source
"most established," and so the terms remain general and subjective,
lacking in factual content, and incapable of being proven true or false.
For example, Plaintiff complained that a reviewer gave "5 stars to
Kentucky Fried Chicken but 1 star to Rafters," and asked "is this a
joke," presumably finding that those rankings made the reviewer
"untrustworthy." CT 188. But to a reader who loves Kentucky Fried
Chicken, the same ranking would signal that the reviewer is
"trustworthy," since whether Kentucky Fried Chicken is a five-star
dining experience is a matter of opinion taking into account inherently
subjective feelings about flavor, price, speed and quality of service,
and myriad other factors.
Similarly, whether content is "useful"- much less whether it is
"the most ... useful content out there" - is indisputably a matter of
opinion, given that people read reviews for different purposes. And
whether a review is "accurate" depends on whether the reader agrees
with the reviewer's opinion. Yelp's claim that it attempts to display
"the most unbiased and accurate" consumer reviews cannot be a
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statement of fact because Yelp's assessment of what reviews are "the
most unbiased and accurate" is subjective, based on a complex
algorithm using factors that Yelp, in the exercise of its editorial
discretion, has chosen.

See,~.

Rappaport v. VV Publ'g, 223

A.D.2d 515, 515-16 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (statements that a judge
was "biased in favor of police officers" and "too lenient in imposing
sentences on police officers" were protected opinion); Simmons v.
Ware, 920 S.W.2d 438, 449 (Tex. Ct.App. 1996) (statement that
reporter's stories were "biased" was protected opinion); cf., Rosenaur
v. Scherer, 88 Cai.App.4th 260,279 (2001) (statements that the
plaintiff was a "liar" and a "thief' were protected opinion).
Plaintiff also alleges that Yelp does not "suppress[] a small
portion of reviews" that is finds "suspicious," but instead suppresses
"a substantial portion of reviews that are unbiased or trustworthy."
CT 695-696. But here too, without a common understanding based in
factual content of what constitutes "a small portion" or what it means
for a review to be "unbiased," or "trustworthy," Yelp's statement
cannot be verified and proven true or false. Indeed, Yelp's comment
that its filtering process "suppresses a small portion of reviews - it
targets those suspicious ones you see on other sites" features the kind
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of generalized, loose, figurative language that signifies classic
opinion. A review that appears to be "suspicious" to one reader may
not look "suspicious" to another reader who happens to agree with the
review!
Nor can Plaintiff prove whether Yelp is "trying to do as good a
job as possible," since there is no verifiable measure for what
constitutes "as a good a job as possible." Indeed, Plaintiff alleges on
information and belief in his Amended Complaint that "Yelp's
automated filter ... allows posts of the most entertaining reviews to be
shown on the unfiltered portion of the website, regardless of the
source." CT 696. But this is clearly a claim that neither he nor
anyone else can prove, since what constitutes an "entertaining review"
will obviously be a matter of opinion.
Just as a court cannot determine whether The Onion is actually
"America's finest news source," whether Fox News provides
reporting that is "fair and balanced," or whether The New York Times
does include "all the news that's fit to print," no Court can determine
whether any of the statements at issue in this case are true or false. As
opinion, the statements are protected, noncommercial speech that fall
well outside of the narrow "commercial speech" exemption.
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This Court should grant review to reject the confusing standard
adopted by the panel here, and make clear that Section 425.17(c)'s
"representations of fact" requirement is satisfied only if the statements
at issue are verifiable, and that subjective opinions like those at issue
here do not fall within the statute's narrow reach.

C.

The Court Should Grant Review to Make Clear that a
Business that Provides a Free Public Forum for
Consumer Reviews Is Not "Primarily Engaged in the
Business of Selling or Leasing Goods or Services"
under Section 425.17(c).

Review also is necessary because the Court of Appeal muddied
Section 425.17(c)(l)'s requirement that Yelp be "primarily engaged in
the business of selling or leasing goods or services" in order to
withdraw the anti-SLAPP statute's protection; it held that Plaintiff
satisfied this statutory requirement merely because Yelp sells
advertising. Op. 19. But Yelp's revenue stream (money received
from advertisements) certainly does not control whether Yelp is
"primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or
services," as the Court of Appeal erroneously believed. Op. 19.
The Court did not even mention the case most closely on point,
New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1103-1104 (C.D. Cal.
2004). There, a federal district court held that a software company
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that primarily provided free software, while selling some commercial
versions, was not primarily engaged in selling or leasing goods or
services. The Court explained that plaintiff's analysis- the same
analysis that the Court of Appeal adopted here -would extend Section
425.17(c)'s reach to businesses such as "Consumer Reports," merely
because it also sells subscriptions and includes links to products on its·
website. The court concluded that it "cannot and does not adopt such
an untenable interpretation of California's newly enacted statute." Id.
at 1104 (emphasis added). Yet that is exactly the interpretation the
Court of Appeal adopted here.
In evaluating the related question of the degree of First
Amendment protection that is afforded to speech sold for a profit such as newspapers, magazines, and many other works that fall
squarely within the First Amendment's protection- courts uniformly
have held that a speaker's profit motive is irrelevant. This basic
principle was formed in the U.S. Supreme Court's seminal First
Amendment case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
266 (1964). Expanding on the holding from Sullivan, the Court
explained a few years later:
If a newspaper's profit motive were determinative, all
aspects of its operations - from the selection of news
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stories to the choice of editorial position -would be
subject to regulation if it could be established that they
were conducted with a view toward increased sales.
Such a basis for regulation clearly would be incompatible
with the First Amendment.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rei. Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973) (emphasis added). The Court has not wavered from this firm
position. !hg,, Board ofTrustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989)
("[w]hile these examples consist of speech for a profit, they do not
consist of speech that proposes a commercial transaction, which is
what defines commercial speech .... Some of our most valued forms
of fully protected speech are uttered for a profit .... " (citations
omitted)); Riley v. Nat'! Fed. of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988)
(speech by paid professional solicitors for charity fully protected by
First Amendment because commercial aspects were of lesser
magnitude and "inextricably intertwined" with protected content
regarding charities); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975)
("[t]he existence of' commercial activity, in itself, is no justification
for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First
Amendment'" (citation omitted)).
This Court too has flatly rejected the idea that a profit motive
converts non-commercial speech into commercial speech. As the
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Court held in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860,
868-869 (1979), "[t]he First Amendment is not limited to those who
publish without charge. . . . The fact that respondents sought to profit
... is not constitutionally significant." See also Spiritual Psychic Sci.
Church ofTruth, Inc. v. City of Azusa, 39 Cal.3d 501,510 (1985),
rejected on another ground, Kasky, 27 Cal.4th at 968 (fortune telling
is not commercial speech merely because it "provides the mechanism
for completing the transaction, and thus relates only to the economic
interests of the parties").
A decision by Division Four of the Second Appellate District is
contrary to the Court of Appeal's decision here. In Kronemyer v.
Internet Movie Database Inc., 150 Cal.App.4th 941 (2007), the Court
of Appeal rejected plaintiff's attempt to escape the anti-SLAPP statute
by arguing that statements on a website were commercial speech
because the speaker "earns money from the Web site." The Court
explained that "[i]f appellant's position that the prospect of some
financial benefit from a publication places the material in the area of
'commercial speech,' it would include virtually all books, magazines,
newspapers and news broadcasts. There is no authority for so
sweeping a definition." Id. at 949. See also All One God Faith, 183
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Cal.App.4th at 1213-1214 (Section 425.17(c) does not apply to
entities acting on behalf of another in promoting goods or services). 7
Plaintiff did not and cannot cite a single case in which the
editorial content of a website that provides a free public forum was
found to be commercial speech based solely on the fact that the
website also sells advertising. To the contrary, as this consistent
authority makes clear, Yelp's "revenue stream" is irrelevant to the
question of whether it is a business "primarily engaged in the business
of selling or leasing goods or services" under Section 425.17(c)(l).
Although Yelp may earn money from advertising -like any
newspaper, magazine or website- its primary business is providing a
free forum for consumer reviews. CT 829-833. On Yelp.com,
businesses can use their free accounts to respond to reviews and
provide information about their businesses, without paying anything
to advertise with Yelp. I d. Indeed, Plaintiff himself describes Yelp as
a website where "[u]sers are permitted to rate local businesses using a
star rating ... Defendant's website draws ... people to it each month
who are able to search for and review the public ratings of
7

See also Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 384 (9th
Cir. 1988) (profit motive irrelevant on issue of whether speech
political or commercial).
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businesses." CT 694 (First Amended Complaint). This is Yelp's
primary business purpose.
Indisputably, Yelp is not primarily a website that sells
advertising. Nobody reasonably would argue that an exclusively online news organization is primarily in the business of providing
advertising just because its only revenue source is advertising. So too,
the Court of Appeal plainly erred in holding that Yelp is primarily
engaged in the business of providing advertising. Such a construction
of Section 425.17 (c) would render the word "primarily" meaningless
and, as a result, impermissibly broaden the exemption.
Finally, the Court of Appeal's belief that Plaintiff's claims "will
not affect" the content or availability of the reviews on Yelp's free
public forum (Op. 19) ignores the scope ofYelp's protection under
the First Amendment. Yelp is entitled not only to use its filtering
process, but also to provide information to Yelp users about the filter
and its effect on the content on Yelp.com. Under the First
Amendment, courts may not dictate to publishers like Yelp the
content of their communications with their audience.

fh&, Miami

Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Rolling
Stone, 181 Cai.App.4th at 690-691. Yelp has the right to not be
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dragged into court and subjected to invasive discovery- including
attempts to obtain a closely-guarded trade secret -merely for
exercising its First Amendment rights.
The Court of Appeal's decision to treat Yelp as nothing more
than a forum for advertisements - instead of the free public forum for
consumer reviews that it actually is- will cause harm to Yelp and a
broad array of businesses that, like Yelp, support a public fora through
advertising dollars. The Court's unprecedented interpretation of
Section 425.17(c) must be reversed.

v.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons discussed above, Yelp respectfully
requests that the Court grant review in this matter and reverse the
Court of Appeal's decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of August,
2014.
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

By:

dhlM\Q..JIJ 1.. ~ IDJq14

Thomas R. Burke '
Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent
YELP INC.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

COURT OF APPEAL -SECOND DIST.

DIVISION ONE

F IL JED
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JAMES DEMETRIADES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

B247151

1

JOSEPH A. LANE, Clerk
SS!cllil

Deputy Clerk

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC484055)

v.
YELP, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Yvette M.
Palazuelos, Judge. Reversed.
Ervin Cohen & Jessup, Robert M. Waxman and David N. Tarlow for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Kendall Brill & Klieger, Laura W. Brill and Nicholas F. Daum for Defendant and
Respondent.

Plaintiff James Demetriades, who operates restaurants in Mammoth Lakes, filed a
complaint seeking an injunction under the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code,

§ 17200 et seq. (UCL)) and False Advertising Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.
(FAL)) to prevent defendant Yelp, Inc. (Yelp), the operator of a popular online website
that contains customer reviews of businesses, from making claims about the accuracy and
efficacy of its "filter" of unreliable or biased customer reviews. The trial court granted
Yelp's special motion to strike plaintiffs complaint under Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16,1 finding that Yelp's statements about the filtering of reviews on a social
media website were matters of public interest. The trial court further found that the
public interest exemption of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17, subdivision (b) did
not apply because plaintiff asserted a personal financial stake in the case, and that the
commercial speech exemption to the anti-SLAPP2 statute set forth in Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.17, subdivision (c) did not apply because Yelp's statements about
the filter were not statements of fact, but were "puffery" and opinion.
We conclude that the commercial speech exemption of section 425.17, subdivision
(c) applies to Yelp's statements concerning the accuracy and efficacy of its review filter,
and therefore find the trial court erred in granting Yelp's special motion to strike under
section 425.16. We reverse.

1

All statutory references herein are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise noted.
2

"SLAPP" suits are "'"civillawsuits ... aimed at preventing citizens from
exercising their political rights or punishing those who have done so." [Citation.)'
[Citation.]" (Church ofScientology v. Wallersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 645
(Church ofScientology), disapproved on another point in Equilon Enterprises v.
Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 53, 68, fn. 5.) SLAPP suits "are brought, not to
vindicate a legal right, but rather to interfere with the defendant's ability to pursue his or
her interests." The aim of a SLAAP suit is to "detract the defendant from his or her
objective, which is adverse to the plaintiff." (Church ofScientology, at p. 645.)
2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1.

Background Facts

Yelp operates a website that serves as a free social media website and search
engine. Yelp is available to the public at no charge and has no registration requirement.
Users who register may post reviews about local businesses, and can rate a business using
a star rating of one to five stars, with five stars being the highest rating. Yelp's website
draws tens of millions of people each month who search for and review the public ratings
of businesses. As of September 2012, users had posted approximately 33 million reviews
to Yelp's website, and according to Google analytics, Yelp had 84 million monthly
unique visitors during the third quarter of2012. Yelp sells advertising on its site to
generate revenue, and in the first three quarters of2012 Yelp generated $91 million in
revenue from advertising.
Yelp constantly battles the problem of unreliable reviews, which generally are
reviews written by friends, employees or relatives of the business being reviewed, paid
reviews, and negative reviews written by business competitors. As a result, Yelp
developed filtering software with the aim of identifying reviews likely to be unreliable.
Yelp started using the filter in 2005, and has worked on improving it since then. The
Yelp filter applies uniform rules to all reviews and does not favor advertisers over
nonadvertisers; Yelp does not use filtered reviews in calculating a business's rating on
Yelp; the filtered reviews do not appear on the main page, but are viewable on a special
"filtered review page"; and business owners can freely post responses to reviews they
receive on Yelp and can contact reviewers privately to engage in further dialogue. To
promote the filter's integrity, Yelp businesses cannot delete, change, or reorder ratings or
reviews. Yelp admits that its filter is not foolproof, and Yelp expressly tells users that
"the filter sometimes affects perfectly legitimate reviews and misses some fake ones, too.
After all, legitimate reviews sometimes look questionable, and questionable reviews
sometimes look legitimate." Plaintiff, when purchasing advertising on Yelp,
acknowledged in the advertising contract that Yelp's filtering software sometimes made
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mistakes. According to Yelp, in addition to relying on the filter, a site user can judge
how much weight to give to any particular review by viewing the reviewer's profile,
reading the reviewer's reviews, and assessing statistics regarding such reviews.
Yelp's filter is proprietary software developed by Yelp that is not distributed or
sold to third parties because disclosure would expose Yelp to the risk of persons using
the information to overcome Yelp's efforts to filter unreliable reviews. Yelp does not
provide the source code or the algorithms to business owners or the general public.
In 2010, Yelp created a cartoon video to educate and contribute to the ongoing
public dialog about the integrity of online reviews.

2.

Plaintiff's Complaint; Yelp's Demurrer

On May 3, 2012, plaintiff filed this action, alleging causes of action for unfair
competition and false advertising under the UCL and FAL. 3 Plaintiff, through a business

3

California's UCL defines "unfair competition" to mean and include "any
unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or
misleading advertising and any act prohibited by [the FAL]." (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17200.) In a suit under the UCL, a public prosecutor may collect civil penalties, but a
private plaintiffs remedies are "generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution."
(Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20
Cal.4th 163, 179; see Bus. & Prof. Code,§§ 17203, 17206.)
California's FAL makes it "unlawful for any person, ... corporation ... , or any
employee thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal property
or to perform services, ... or to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating
thereto, to make or disseminate ... before the public in this state, ... in any newspaper or
other publication ... or in any other manner or means whatever ... any statement,
concerning that real or personal property or those services ... which is untrue or
misleading, and which is known, ·or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be
known, to be untrue or misleading .... " (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500.) As with the
UCL, an action for violation of the FAL may be brought either by a public prosecutor or
by any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public who has
suffered injury in fact, and the remedies available to a successful private plaintiff include
restitution and injunctive relief. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17204, 17535.) A "person" is
defined as any individual, partnership, firm, association, or corporation. (§ 17506.)
4

entity,4 owns the Mammoth Lakes restaurants Jimmy's Taverna, Rafters, and Red
Lantern. Plaintiff instructed Jack Carter, the restaurant manager of Rafters, to obtain
advertising on Yelp for Rafters. Commencing in June 2011 through January 2012,
plaintiff purchased advertising for his restaurants on Yelp's website.
Plaintiff alleged that Yelp engaged in false advertising by claiming that each user
review passed through a "filter" that gave consumers "the most trusted reviews."
According to plaintiff, Yelp advertised that:
1. "Yelp uses a filter to give consumers the most trusted reviews";
2. "All reviews that live on people's profile pages go through a remarkable
filtering process that takes the reviews that are the most trustworthy and from the most
established sources and displays them on the business page. This keeps the less
trustworthy reviews out so that when it comes time to make a decision you can make that
[decision] using information and insights that are actually helpful";
3. "Rest assured that our engineers are working to make sure that whatever is up
there is the most unbiased and accurate information you will be able to find about local
businesses"; and
4. "Yelp is always working to do as good a job as possible on a very complicated
task--<lnly showing the most trustworthy and useful content out there"; and
5. "Yelp has an automated filter that suppresses a small portion of reviews-it
targets those suspicious ones you see on other sites." (Boldface omitted.)
Plaintiff asserted these statements were misleading and untrue. Plaintiff asserted
that Yelp did not use the filter to give consumers the most trusted reviews and the filter
did not accurately separate the most trustworthy reviews from unreliable reviews, nor did
the filter only post reviews from trusted sources. Instead, Yelp's automated filter
suppressed more than only a small portion of reviews; allowed posts of the "most
entertaining" reviews to be shown on the unfiltered portion of the website, regardless of
4 Plaintiff owns the restaurants through a limited liability corporation known as
Multiversal Enterprises Mammoth Properties LLC (MEMP).
5

the source; allowed posts of reviews to be shown on the unfiltered portion of a local
business page regardless of whether the source was trustworthy or unbiased; and
suppressed a substantial portion of reviews that were unbiased and trustworthy. Further,
plaintiff asserted that Yelp's website contained reviews from persons who were
"specifically and demonstrably biased against the businesses which they review." Based
on plaintiffs background in software, plaintiff did not believe Yelp's filter was capable
of distinguishing between trustworthy and untrustworthy reviews.

In particular, plaintiff asserted that while Rafters received 102 reviews on Yelp, 50
of those reviews were filtered. In addition, a reviewer named "Travis I." made false
statements about plaintiff's restaurants, yet Yelp's filter did not catch those review.
Plaintiff reported Travis I.'s reviews toY elp, but Yelp did not take any action. In April
2012, plaintiff complained to Yelp about reviews of the Rafters and the Red Lantern,
demanded changes in the display, threatened litigation aimed at public disclosure of
Yelp's software, and sought the identity of the reviewer named Travis I. who had posted
negative reviews. 5 On the other hand, according to Yelp, the Yelp filter caught several
positive reviews of the plaintiff's restaurants that Yelp alleges were placed by an IP
address associated with the restaurants.
Plaintiff suffered injury from the acts of Yelp, including spending money to
purchase advertising from Yelp based on Yelp's representations that user reviews were
filtered. Plaintiff sought an injunction to stop Yelp from continuing to engage in untrue
and misleading representations.
Yelp demurred to the complaint, arguing that the proper plaintiff was MEM.P, the
entity that directly owned the restaurants. Yelp also filed a motion to strike under section
425.16. On September 7, 2012, plaintiff, without changing his status as an individual
plaintiff, filed a first amended complaint (FAC) alleging that, among other things,

5

Plaintiff simultaneously filed an action against "John Doe," (Travis I., the
negative reviewer of plaintiffs restaurant), seeking damages for libel. Plaintiff did not
file a notice of related cases in this action or in his action against "John Doe."
6

plaintifi did not seek monetary damages of any kind under the UCL or F AL. Plaintiff
sought an order enjoining Yelp from making any statements concerning its filter which
were untrue or misleading, filtering user reviews on the Yelp website while falsely
advertising that the unfiltered reviews posted were fair, trustworthy, or unbiased.

3.

Yelp's Motion to Strike

Yelp filed a second motion to strike, arguing that plaintiff's complaint targeted
protected activity under section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(4) and by his
complaint, plaintiff sought to interfere with both Yelp's review publishing process and
Yelp's ability to offer opinions about that process, which conduct interfered with Yelp's
free speech rights and targeted speech that appeared in a public forum and was a matter
of public interest.
Further, Yelp argued that plaintiff would not prevail on the merits because
plaintiff had suffered no injury and thus lacked standing under both the UCL and FAL;
even if plaintiff had suffered injury in the form of purchasing advertising, the facts
showed that plaintiff did not individually purchase the advertising for Rafter. Further,
the Communications Decency Act (CDA), title 47 United States Code section 230
precluded liability because the CDA provided that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider" and " [n ]o cause of action may be brought and
no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with" the
CDA. Finally, Yelp contended its statements constituted nonactionable opinions because
a reasonable person would not interpret Yelp's statements about its filter as a guarantee
of its performance; rather, the statements were general opinions about Yelp's evolving
filtering goals.

4.

Plaintiff's Opposition to Yelp's Motion to Strike

Plaintiff's opposition detailed that plaintiff was the manager of an entity that
owned three Mammoth Lakes restaurants: Jimmy's Taverna, Rafters, and Red Lantern.
Plaintiff instructed Jack Carter, the restaurant manager of Rafters, to obtain advertising
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on Yelp for Rafters. In purchasing advertising, plaintiff relied on Yelp's statements
concerning its filter in purchasing advertising, but soon realized that Yelp's
representations concerning its filter were not accurate because of the 102 reviews Rafters
received, 50 had been filtered. Further, Rafters received unfiltered negative reviews from
a reviewer who made false statements about the restaurant, yet Yelp's filter did not catch
these false reviews.
Addressing the merits of Yelp's motion to strike, plaintiff argued that the
commercial speech exemption of section 425.17, subdivision (c), applied to Yelp's
statements. 6 Plaintiff argued that his action arose out of the five direct statements of fact
from Yelp's website concerning its review filer, which statements were made for the
purpose of promoting the advertising services offered by Yelp. In addition, plaintiff
asserted that the FAC was brought solely in the public interest to enjoin Yelp's false
statements about its review filter and was exempt from attack by virtue of section 425.17,
subdivision (b). 7

6

Section 425.17, subdivision (c) provides that section 425.16 "does not apply to
any cause of action brought against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling
or leasing goods or services ... if both of the following conditions exist: [~] (1) The
statement or conduct consists of representations of fact about that person's or a business
competitor's business operations, goods, or services, that is made for the purpose of
obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing sales or leases of, or commercial
transactions in, the person's goods or services, or the statement or conduct was made in
the course of delivering the person's goods or services; and [~ (2) The intended
audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer, or a person likely to repeat the
statement to, or otherwise influence, an actual or potential buyer or customer, or the
statement or conduct arose out of or within the context of a regulatory approval process,
proceeding, or investigation, except where the statement or conduct was made by a
telephone corporation in the course of a proceeding before the California Public Utilities
Commission and is the subject of a lawsuit brought by a competitor, notwithstanding that
the conduct or statement concerns an important public issue."
7

Section 425.17, subdivision (b) provides that "Section 425.16 does not apply to
any action brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public if all of
the following conditions exist: [~] (1) The plaintiff does not seek any relief greater than
or different from the relief sought for the general public or a class of which the plaintiff is
8

In reply, Yelp argued that neither of the exemptions of section 425.17,
subdivisions (b) or (c) applied; further, plaintiff could not show a probability of
prevailing on the merits under section 425.16 because he lacked standing; Yelp's
statements were not deceptive as a matter oflaw; and the CDA barred plaintiffs claims.

5.

Trial Court Ruling

On January 25,2013, the trial court granted Yelp's special motion to strike. The
trial court found that Yelp met its initial burden of establishing that its statements arose
from protected activity because statements regarding the filtering of reviews on a social
media site such as Yelp are matters of public interest and are therefore protected.
Further, plaintiff failed to establish the public interest exemption of section 425.17,
subdivision (b) applied because the action was not brought solely in the public interest as
plaintiff had a personal financial stake in the case based on negative reviews. The court
found plaintiff also failed to show the commercial speech exemption of section 425.17,
subdivision (c) applied becal;!Se the statements regarding the reviews did not relate to the
selling of advertising and plaintiff failed to show that the statements were statements of
fact and not opinion or puffery. Finally, the court found plaintiff failed to establish a
probability of prevailing on the merits because plaintiff, who was not the owner of the
restaurants, lacked standing and Yelp's alleged misrepresentations were puffery and
opinion.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that under section 425.17, if an action is prosecuted solely in the
public interest or against a person engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or
services who makes statements about those goods and services, the action is not subject

a member. A claim for attorney's fees, costs, or penalties does not constitute greater or
different relieffor purposes of this subdivision. [~] (2) The action, if successful, would
enforce an imp01iant right affecting the public interest, and would confer a significant
benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, on the general public or a large class of
persons. [~ (3) Private enforcement is necessary and places a disproportionate financial
burden on the plaintiff in relation to the plaintiffs stake in the matter."
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to the provisions of section 425.16 as a SLAPP suit. (§ 425.17, subds. (b), (c).) First,
plaintiff argues that this action was brought in the public interest because the FAC alleges
Yelp engaged in the advertising alleged with intent to induce members of the public to
visit its website and view advertisements and reviews and that Yelp engaged in false
advertising to the public, including plaintiff; furthermore, the action, if successful, will
enforce an important right and confer a benefit upon the public because it will put an end
to Yelp's false advertising and unfair competition. Second, plaintiff argues that Yelp's
commercial speech is exempted from the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute because
the action arises out of Yelp's false statements concerning the accuracy and superiority of
its review filter and Yelp's statements were made for the purpose of promoting the
advertising services Yelp offered, and such statements were actionable because they were
statements of fact, not opinion.
Yelp counters that plaintiff has failed to show the public interest exemption of
subdivision (b) applies because here plaintiff seeks relief different from or greater than
members of the public at large; rather, the FAC discloses that plaintiff has a significant
private interest; in addition, the action will not benefit the public because the only issue at
stake is plaintiff's personal interest; and plaintiff's financial interest in Rafters is
substantial and thus he can meet the burdens of litigation. Further, plaintiff has failed to
establish that the commercial speech exemption applies because (I) although Yelp sells
advertising, it is primarily engaged in providing a free public forum for members to read
and write reviews about local business, services, and other entities; (2) the statements
made do not concern commercial speech because they are not directed at advertising; and
(3) the intended audience of the statements is not an actual or potential buyer or
consumer because the intended audience is potential reviewers, not buyers of advertising;
(4) the statements are not statements of fact, but are puffery because the statements make
clear the filtering software is not perfect. Finally, Yelp asserts that plaintiff did not suffer
actual economic injury and has no standing because the owner of the restaurants is
MEMP.
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We conclude that plaintiffs action is squarely within the commercial speech
exemption of section 425.17, subdivision (c) and reverse.

I.

Standing
Yelp contends that the business entity, MEMP, that owns the restaurants receiving

reviews on its website is the proper party plaintiff in this action, because it is the party
who has suffered alleged damages based on fraudulent reviews. While we agree the
proper plaintiff to this action is the entity suffering damages, this defect in naming the
real party in interest is not fatal to this action. 8
Every action must be prosecuted by the real party in interest. (§ 367.) Under
certain circumstances, a complaint may be amended to substitute a new plaintiff where it
is determined the named plaintiff is not the proper party to maintain the alleged claims, so
long as the amendment does not present an entirely new set of facts and the defendant is
not prejudiced. The substitution of a new plaintiff is proper where original plaintiff was
found to have no. standing to prosecute action after the original complaint has been filed.
(Jensen v. Royal Pools ( 1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 717, 721.) Thus, where a shareholder seeks
to enforce a claim belonging to the corporation, the complaint may be amended to
substitute the corporation as the named plaintiff. (See, e.g., Klopstock v. Superior Court
(1941) 17 Cal.2d 13, 21.) With respect to the amendment of Business and Professions
Code section 17204, which limited standing in "unfair competition" actions under
Business and Professions Code section 17200 to persons who had suffered "injury in
fact'' and "lost money or property" (unlike former law, under which plaintiffs could sue

8

A plaintiffs right to sue is not relevant to the first prong of the section 425.16
analysis, but to the second prong of the analysis that focuses on "whyther [an opposing]
plaintiff has established a probability of prevailing on the claim." (City ofRiverside v.
Stansbury (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1594 [plaintiffs right to sue is not addressed on
first prong of section 425.16 analysis but may be a proper subject of demurrer].) Here,
we do not reach the second prong of the section 425.16 analysis because we conclude
that plaintiffs complaint is subject to the exemption of section 425.17; nonetheless,
because the standing issue is of jurisdictional importance and defendant raised it below,
we address it here.
ll

on behalf of the general public), amendment is proper to substitute a plaintiff who meets
the modified standing requirement in place of one who does not. (Foundation for
Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Nextel Communications, Inc. (2006) 143 Cai.App.4th
131, 136.)
Substitution of new plaintiffs requires leave of court pursuant to section 4 73.
Although there is a policy of great "liberality" in permitting amendments to pleadings,
the trial court must consider various factors, including whether the substitution would
prejudice the defendant (e.g., by delaying trial, or increasing discovery burden). (Royal
Thrift & Loan Co. v. County Escrow, Inc. (2004) 123 Cai.App.4th 24, 41-42; Jensen v.
Royal Pools, supra, 48 Cai.App.3d at p. 721.) Here, the current plaintiff, though an
individual and not the business entity that is the direct owner of the restaurants, does not
appear to have had an inappropriate motive in naming himself as plaintiff. 9 Thus, to the
extent that the party suffering damages in this case is MEMP, as opposed to plaintiff,
plaintiff should be permitted to move to amend the complaint in this action to substitute
the proper party plaintiff and demonstrate a lack of prejudice to Yelp from the
amendment.

II.

Yelp's Representations About Its Review Filter Constitute Commercial

Speech Squarely Within the Exemption of Section 425.17, Subdivision (c)
A.

Special Motions to Strike Under Section 425.I 6

Section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute is aimed at curbing "lawsuits brought ·
primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and
petition for the redress of grievances." (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) Section425.16 extends
protection to conduct that furthers the exercise of free speech in connection with an issue
of public interest. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) Section 425.16 provides that a "cause of
9

The UCL provides that "the term person shall mean and include natural persons,
corporations, firms, partnerships, joint stock companies, associations and other
organizations of persons." (Bus. & Prof. Code,§ 17201.) Similarly, the FAL provides
that a '"person'" is defined as "any individual, partnership, firm, association, or
corporation.'' (Bus. & Prof. Code,§ 17506.)
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action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's
right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to
strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(l).) The
Legislature commands that the provisions of the anti-SLAPP statute be broadly
construed. (§ 425.16, subd. (a); Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Ca1.4th
728, 735.)
Subdivision (e) of section 425.16 delineates the type of speech or petitioning
activity protected. Such acts include (I) written or oral statements "made before a
legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding"; (2) written or oral statements "made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body"; (3) written or oral statements "made in a place open to the public or in a
public forum in connection with an issue of public interest"; or (4) "any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right
of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest." (§ 425.16,
subd. (e).) Yelp here relieson section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(4).
Ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion is a two-step process. First, the trial court must
determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the challenged
cause of action arises from protected activity. (People ex rel. Fire Ins. Exchange v.
Anapol (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 809, 822.) If, and only if, the defendant makes that
showing must the trial court proceed to the second step-determination of whether the
plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Ibid.) The appellate court
reviews a ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion de novo, using the same two-step process.
(Coretronic Corp. v. Cozen O'Connor (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1387; Cabral v.
Martins (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471, 478.)
The party making a special motion to strike must make a prima facie showing that
the plaintiff's cause of action arises from the defendant's free speech or petition activity.
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(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 82, 88.) Once the defendant makes a prima facie
showing, "the burden shifts to the plaintiffto ... 'make a prima facie showing of facts
which would, if proved at trial, support a judgment in plaintiff's favor."' (Church of
Scientology, supra, 42 Cai.App.4th at p. 646.) In making these determinations, the trial
court considers the pleadings and the supporting and opposing affidavits setting forth the
facts upon which liability or defense is predicated. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2); Church of
Scientology, at p. 646.)
An order granting or denying a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute is

.appealable. (§ 425.16, subd.

G).) On appeal, we exercise our independent judgment to

determine whether the litigation arises out of protected activity and whether the plaintiff
is likely to prevail. (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cai.App.4th 892, 906.)

B.

The Commercial Speech Exemption ofSection 425.17, Subdivision (c)

The Legislature enacted section 425.17 in response to a "disturbing abuse" of
section 425.16. (§ 425.17, subd. (a}.) Subdivision (c) of section 425.17 "enumerate[s]
circumstances where the special motion to strike screening mechanism is unavailable."
(Sunset Millennium Associates, LLC v. LHO Grafton Hotel, L.P. (2006) 146 Cai.App.4th
300, 312.) Under the two-prong test of section 425.16, whether a section 425.17
exemption applies is a first-prong determination. (See Brill Media Co., LLC v. TCW
Group, Inc. (2005) 132 Cai.App.4th 324, 330 (Brill Media}, disapproved on other
grounds in Simpson Strong-Tie Company, Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal. 4th 12, 25
[applicability of§ 425.17, subd. (c) exemption is a first-prong analysis under§ 425.16].)
Brill Media reasoned that section 425.17, subdivision (c) begins with the words, "Section
425.16 does not apply .... "and then specifies an array of circumstances in which it does
not apply. (Brill Media, at p. 330.) As set forth in Simpson Strong-Tie Company,
however, contrary to the holding of Brill Media, the burden is on the plaintiff to show
that an exemption of section 425.17 applies. (Simpson Strong-Tie Company, at p. 26.)
Section 425.17, subdivision (c) provides in relevant part that "Section 425.16 does
not apply to any cause of action brought against a person primarily engaged in the
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business of selling or leasing goods or services ... [t] (1) The statement or conduct
consists of representations of fact about that person's or a business competitor's business
operations, goods, or services, that is made for the purpose of obtaining approval for,
promoting, or securing sales or leases of, or commercial transactions in, the person's
goods or services, or the statement or conduct was made in the course of delivering the
person's goods or services; and

[~]

(2) the intended audience is an actual or potential

buyer or customer, or a person likely to repeat the statement to, or otherwise influence, an
actual or potential buyer or customer .... " A party must satisfY both prongs of this
exemption to benefit from the exemption of section 425.17, subdivision (c). (Hawran v.

Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 273.)
The legislative history indicates this legislation is aimed squarely at false
advertising claims and is designed to permit them to proceed without having to undergo
scrutiny under the anti-SLAPP statute. Proponents of the legislation argued that
corporations were improperly using the anti-SLAPP statute to burden plaintiffs who were
pursuing unfair competition or false advertising claims. The proponents noted that law
seminars were being conducted on the unfair competition law, "encouraging corporations
to use the SLAPP motions as [a) new litigation weapon to slow down and perhaps even
get out oflitigation." (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Sen. Bill No. 515
(2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jul. 8, 2003; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 515 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended May I, 2003.)
As the court explained in Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 939, a false
advertising case under the UCL and F AL, "when a court must decide whether particular
speech may be subjected to laws aimed at preventing false advertising or other forms of
commercial deception, categorizing a particular statement as commercial or
noncommercial speech requires consideration of three elements: the speaker, the
intended audience, and the content of the message.

[~]

In typical commercial speech

cases, the speaker is likely to be someone engaged in commerce--that is, generally, the
production, distribution, or sale of goods or services-or someone acting on behalf of a
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person so engaged, and the intended audience is likely to be actual or potential buyers or
customers of the speaker's goods or services, or persons acting for actual or potential
buyers or customers, or persons (such as reporters or reviewers) likely to repeat the
message to or otherwise influence actual or potential buyers or customers. . . .

[~]

[I]n

deciding whether speech is commercial, two relevant considerations are advertising
format and economic motivation. [Citation.] These considerations imply that
commercial speech generally or typically is directed to an audience of persons who may
be influenced by that speech to engage in a commercial transaction with the speaker or
the person on whose behalf the speaker is acting. Speech in advertising format typically,
although not invariably, is speech about a product or service by a person who is offering
that product or service at a price, directed to persons who may want, and be willing to
pay for, that product or service. . . . [Citation.] Economic motivation likewise implies
that the speech is intended to lead to commercial transactions, which in turn assumes that
the speaker and the target audience are persons who will engage in those transactions, or
their agents or intermediaries." (Kasky, at pp. 960-961, italics omitted.) The court in

Kasky continued, "[f]inally, the factual content of the message should be commercial in
character. In the context of regulation of false or misleading advertising, this typically
means that the speech consists of representations of fact about the business operations,
products, or services of the speaker (or the individual or company that the speaker
represents), made for the purpose of promoting sales of, or other commercial transactions
in, the speaker's products or services." (/d at p. 961.)
Thus, an editorial layout in a magazine that placed a cigarette ad near depictions of
plaintiff was not commercial speech within the section 425.17, subdivision (c)
exemption. (Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 664, 676.) Plaintiff, a
rock musician, asserted that a cigarette ad placed near an editorial layout constituted
misappropriation of his name, misappropriation of his right to publicity, and unfair
business practices under the UCL. (Stewart, at p. 674.) The court rejected the plaintiff's
contention that the action was within the subdivision (c) exemption: "It is true that
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defendant[ s] [are] primarily engaged in the business of selling goods,' however, as
plaintiffs concede, the goods [defendants] sell are copies of Rolling Stone magazine, not
Camel cigarettes. More significantly, the statement or conduct at issue here did not
consist of 'representations of fact about the business operations, goods or services' of
Rolling Stone or of any of defendants' business competitors. Instead, the representation
at the center of this lawsuit is the representation that plaintiffs and their fellow musicians
endorse the sale and use of Camel cigarettes. Accordingly, the first condition set forth in
section 425.17, subdivision (c), is not satisfied with respect to defendants and this limited
exemption is therefore inapplicable." (Stewart, at pp. 676-677.)
Here, plaintiff's claims satisfY both prongs of section 425.17, subdivision (c).
Although Yelp's website is a public forum and contains matters of public concern in its
reviews of restaurants and other businesses (Hupp v. Freedom Communications, Inc.
(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 398, 404), unlike the editorial content of Stewart v. Rolling Stone

LLC, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th 664, Yelp's statements about its review filter-as opposed
to the content of the reviews themselves-are commercial speech about the quality of its
product (the reliability of its review filter) intended to reach third parties to induce them
to engage in a commercial transaction (patronizing Yelp's website, which patronage
induces businesses on Yelp to purchase advertising).

I.

Yelp's Statements About Its Review Filter Consist ofRepresentations

ofFact about Yelp's Website That Are Made for the Purpose ofObtaining Approval for,
Promoting, or Securing Advertisements on Yelp's Website, and Yelp's Statements Were
Made in the Course ofDelivering Yelp's Website
Yelp's statements about the efficacy of its review filter consist of representations
of fact about its services, and are not mere puffery or opinion. "A statement is considered
puffery if the claim is extremely unlikely to induce consumer reliance. Ultimately, the
difference between a statement of fact and mere puffery rests in the specificity or
generality of the claim. [Citation.] 'The common theme that seems to run through cases
considering puffery in a variety of contexts is that consumer reliance will be induced by
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specific rather than general assertions.' [Citation.] Thus, a statement that is quantifiable,
that makes a claim as to the 'specific or absolute characteristics of a product,' may be an
actionable statement of fact while a general, subjective claim about a product is nonactionable puffery. [Citation.]" (Newcal Industries, Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution (9th Cir.
2008) 513 F.3d 1038, 1053.)
Thus, Yelp's statements that ""Yelp uses a filter to give consumers the most
trusted reviews"; "All reviews that live on people's profile pages go through a
remarkable filtering process that takes the reviews that are the most trustworthy and from
the most established sources and displays them on the business page. This keeps the less
trustworthy reviews out so that when it comes time to make a decision you can make that
using information and insights that are actually helpful"; "Rest assured that our engineers
are working to make sure that whatever is up there is the most unbiased and accurate
information you will be able to find about local businesses"; "Yelp is always working to
do as good a job as possible on a very complicated task-only showing the most
trustworthy and useful content out there"; and "Yelp has an automated filter that
suppresses a small portion of reviews-it targets those suspicious ones you see on other
sites" are more than puffery, they are statements of fact. Yelp's statements are factual
because they are intended to induce consumer reliance on Yelp's reviews by making
specific and detailed statements intended to induce reliance, such as: the filter "give[s]"
consumers the "most trusted" reviews, and Yelp's engineers (a word inspiring
confidence) are working to provide the "most unbiased and accurate" information
available. Although in making these statements, Yelp may use words of emphasis
("remarkable filtering process," "most trustworthy," "most established sources"), Yelp's
specific representations about the accuracy of its review filter go beyond mere
expressions of opinion or puffery and hyperbole; rather Yelp speaks with the authority of
a website that intends to attract users with the accuracy of its filter.
Thus, it is illogical to conclude that Yelp's statements that all reviews on its
website are filtered is intended to mean anything other than that. If Yelp intended the
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statements as puffery or opinion, in the context of Yelp's advertising-driven website such
statements would have limited utility; thus Yelp would have had no legitimate purpose in
making those statements about its review filter.

2.

Yelp's Intended Audience Is an Actual or Potential Buyer or

Customer, or a Person Likely to Repeat the Statement to, or Otherwise Influence, an
Actual or Potential Buyer or Customer
Yelp's audience consists of reviewers, readers of reviews, and businesses that may
or may not purchase advertising on Yelp's website. Although Yelp only receives direct
revenue from those businesses that advertise, such businesses would not be advertising
on Yelp without the potential benefit they could obtain from users' reviews and without
assurances that potential patrons of their business establishments would be reading only
reliable reviews. Further, as Yelp's revenue stream indicates, Yelp is primarily in the
business of providing advertising to businesses; the user reviews of businesses are a
device whereby prospective users and reviewers are attracted to Yelp's website. Thus,
Yelp's statements about the accuracy and performance of its review filter are designed to
attract users and ultimately purchasers of advertising on its site.
We note that by his complaint plaintiff does not seek to stop Yelp's use of the
filter, or obtain information on the mechanics of the filter. Instead, plaintiff seeks to
enjoin commercial statements of ostensible fact that plaintiff alleges are false and
misleading. Thus, to the extent plaintiff were to obtain the relief sought (an injunction),
such relief would not interfere with Yelp or its users' commercial speech: Users can
continue to post and read reviews; Yelp can continue to solicit advertising based upon the
content of its site (user reviews and business advertising); and Yelp can continue to use
its review filter. Narrowly targeted injunctive relief will not affect the content of Yelp's
reviewers statements or the availability ofYelp's reviewers' statements.
As we conclude that plaintiff has established his action is subject to the exemption
of section 425.17, subdivision (c), we need not consider the applicability of the
exemption of section 425.17, subdivision (b) under the first prong analysis, and also need
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not consider the second prong of the section 425.16 analysis, namely, whether plaintiff
has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits.

III.

The Federal Communications Decency Act Does Not Apply
Yelp asserts that the CDA, title 47 United States Code section 230, bars plaintiff's

claims because it provides protections for editorial functions exercised by website
operators with regard to third-partY material; courts uniformly hold that claims based on a
website's editorial decisions (publication, or failure to publish, certain third-PartY
conduct) is barred by section 230.
Section 230 of the CDA provides in relevant part, "[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider." (47 U.S. C.§ 230(c)(l).)
However, as this language demonstrates, Yelp's argument is misplaced. Nowhere does
plaintiff seek to enjoin or hold Yelp liable for the statements of third parties (i.e.,
reviewers) on its website. Rather, plaintiff seeks to hold Yelp liable for its own
statements regarding the accuracy of its filter.
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DISPOSITION
The order is reversed, and plaintiff shall be given an opportunity to move to
amend his complaint to substitute the real party in interest in this action as plaintiff.
James Demetriades is to recover his costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

JOHNSON, J.

We concur:

CHANEY,ActingP. J.

MILLER,J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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